

Firm Strategies and the (Ir)Relevance of the Distinction Between For-Profit and Non-Profit Organizations

The case of the French home care services industry

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Abstract: This paper discusses the common dichotomy between non-profit organisations (NPO) and for-profit organisations (FPO) through the study of the French home care services industry. The analytical framework of productive model (Boyer & Freyssenet) links the economic dimension and the political dimension that coexist into an organisation. This framework is used to characterise the discourses of NPO and FPO into ideal-types. 15 monographs of organizations are then compared to these ideal-types. An ascending hierarchical classification identifies two groups of organizations that include both NPO and FPO regarding to the closeness of their productive models. The classification also identifies a group of NPO with a productive model close to the FPO's ideal-type of productive model. Thus, I conclude that it is their legal status that differentiates them rather than their productive models.

Résumé en français : En mobilisant le cadre des modèles productifs (développé par Boyer et Freyssenet), ce papier discute de la distinction couramment faite entre associations et entreprise en s'appuyant sur le cas de l'aide à domicile. Après avoir passé en revue les principaux enseignements de la littérature sur les tensions dans la définition de ces deux types d'organisation autour de leur appartenance ou non à l'économie sociale, nous présentons le cadre théorique mobilisé afin de caractériser à la fois les dimensions économique et politique de ces organisations. Cela nous permet ensuite de construire des versions idéelles des modèles productifs de ces deux formes d'organisation au regard de leur identité discursive. Ces deux idéaux-types sont ensuite confrontés à des observations de terrain (monographie de 15 organisations représentant l'ensemble des compétiteurs sur un bassin de concurrence). Une classification ascendante hiérarchique de leurs modèles productifs identifie deux groupes d'organisations qui comprennent à la fois des associations et des entreprises. La classification identifie également un groupe d'une association au modèle productif proche de l'idéal-type des entreprises. Nous en déduisons que l'observation par les modèles productifs contribue à remettre en question une opposition association/entreprise fondée le plus souvent sur les seuls statuts juridiques.

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1. Introduction

This paper aims at discussing the common dichotomy between non-profit organizations and for-profit organizations. The French industry of home care services is particularly relevant for this purpose. Indeed, a recent public policy –the plan for lifestyle and home care services development (2005), organized a contestable market while it reinforces the dichotomy between non-profit organizations (NPO) and for-profit organizations (FPO). According to the planners, the development of services with all the characteristics of private services should allow the entry of for profit companies while the historical non profit organizations should stay on a restricted part of the market: the home social care services (Cahuc & Debonneuil, 2004). In this way, a competition-based economic policy is introduced into the sector of lifestyle home care services as a whole. The common opposition between NPO and FPO is reinforced through a public policy that segments the specific industry of home care services. The collective discourses of NPO and FPO also built two distinct collective identities. NPO calls the other group of competitors as “the privates”, “the for-profit”. They criticize their commercial development in high-income areas, and so on. At the opposite, the FPO blame the NPO for restricting their market entry by building access barriers to the public subsidies and to the customers who benefits of cash-for-care. However, can such an opposition persist beyond the discourses?

The productive models’ framework allows going beyond the discourses. Initially developed by Boyer and Freyssenet (2002b) in order to characterize the automotive industry, it links the economic dimension and the political dimension that coexist into an organization. The political dimension refers to the decisions (and non-decisions) in terms of product policy, division of labor and employment relationship. The economic dimension is characterized with the “profit strategy”. Of course, the idea of “profit strategy” is hardly compatible with NPO, nevertheless I assume that “profit strategy” can easily be enlarged to “competitiveness strategy”, a kind of strategy compatible with NPO.

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The paper is organized as follow. The next section briefly reviews the observed convergences between NPO and FPO, in particular through the field of what *Social Economy* is. The third section describes the productive models framework, as developed by Boyer and Freyssenet, and proposes some adjustments to take into account the specificities of the home care services industry. The fourth section translates the two opposite narratives of organizational identity into ideal-types of productive models. The fifth section briefly presents the opposition between NPO and FPO within the French statistics of lifestyle and home cares services industry. The sixth section characterizes home care services organizations of a competition area (8 associations, 7 FPO) regarding to the ideal-types established in section 4. An ascending hierarchical classification of their productive models leads to qualify the narrative opposition between NPO and FPO: their profit strategy seems closed even if the competitiveness strategy differs. The classification identifies two groups of organizations that include both NPO and FPO regarding to the closeness of their productive models. The classification also identify a group of NPO with a productive models close of the FPO' ideal-type of productive model. The seventh section discusses the opposition between NPO and FPO regarding to these results. The eighth section concludes.

2. Social economy and the challenge of Social enterprises and Hybrid organizations: toward new boundaries between NPO and FPO

Since the seminal theory of nonprofit organizations of Hansmann (1980), many studies dealing with organizations and firms' strategies reinforce the duality between NPO and FPO (e.g. Ballou & Weisbrod, 2003, Ronald, McGregor & al., 2016, Zhu, Wang & al., 2014).

NPO are usually characterized as *Third sector* and are supposed to respond to three characteristics:

- “(i) *Privateness* i.e. forms of individual or collective action that are outside the sphere and control of government;
- (ii) *Public purpose* i.e. serving the broader community and not primarily to generating profit or otherwise creating something of value primarily to the persons undertaking the activities or those persons' family member; and
- (iii) *Free choice* i.e. pursued without compulsion.” (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2016, p. 15, emphasis in original).

These characteristics differentiate the Third sector organizations from the Market, the State and the Family. Yet, this area can serve the objective of the states and may be led to act on the market and then to hybridize two sorts of resources: non-market resources and market resources. Consequently there are tensions to define a crossover object as Third sector. A common conceptualization of Third sector is harder to develop as its acceptance differs from one country to the other. Furthermore, the parallel usage of *Social economy* as a quasi-synonym of Third sector questions previous conceptualization of the latter concept.

French and Belgium conception of Social economy (SE) not only includes non-profit organizations but also cooperatives and mutuals that explicitly produce for the market and are for-profit organizations. In the UK, *Social enterprises* –belonging to Social Economy- use market-type activities to serve social purposes. As home care services have a social goal, each kind of producer might belong to SE. As Salamon & Sokolowski (2016) sum up, “the social economy concept as widely used thus blurs the line between

market-based, for profit entities and the nonprofit, or nonprofit-distributing entities that are central to many northern European and Anglo-Saxon conceptions of what forms the heart of the third sector” (p. 11). The global growth of this sort of organizations, in particular social enterprises, challenges the seminal definition of the third sector - and of the social economy.

The Japan is exemplar of this challenge. Indeed, into the Japanese definition of Third sector, NPO legally can have a behavior closed to for-profit organizations (Yamauchi, 2016). Third sector’s organizations, *“do not have to operate under a capital lock, and retained surplus may be distributed to stakeholders”* (Yamauchi, 2016, p. 11). Social enterprises are exemplar of this scheme. According to the definition of the Cabinet Office of Japan (see box 1), 11.7% of Japanese small and medium enterprises (SME) are Social enterprises. Furthermore as there is no special legal category for Social enterprise, 91% of them are for-profit SME and only 9% are non-profit. According to these results, categorizing social enterprise as part of the Third sector/social economy or not seems a crucial issue and call for a better understanding of what a social enterprise is.

Box 1 – The definition of a social enterprise from the Cabinet Office of Japan

1. The enterprise should have mainly social or environmental aims.
2. It should agree that it is a business with primarily social or environmental objectives, not with the pursuit of profit.
3. It should agree that it is a business whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or community rather than mainly being paid to shareholders and owners.
4. It should not pay more than 50 percent of profit or surplus to owners or shareholders.
5. It should not generate less than 50 percent of income from business

Yamauchi (2016, p. 12)

As seen above, a short, condensed and common definition of Social enterprise could be: “a market solution to a social problem”. Yet this definition seems too large and may include any sort of enterprise. So the nature and the characteristics of social enterprise have to be better specified.

Defourny & Nyssens (2016)⁴ define four models of social enterprises by combining interest principle (general interest, mutual interest and capital interest) and the nature of the resources (public funding, hybrid and market income). The first is the entrepreneurial non-profit model, including all non-profit organizations that develop market activity in order to support their social mission. The French home care services’ NPO should be classified into this category, as home care services are explicitly market-oriented since the Plan Borloo. The second model is the social cooperative model. It *“usually results from a move of mutual interest organizations towards a behavior giving more importance to the general interest”* (p. 13). The third is the public sector social enterprise model that relies on an externalization of public services, leading to a marketization of resources. These second and third models are marginal in the French industry of home care services. It’s not the case of the FPO, which may be included into the last model of social enterprise: the social business model. It characterizes SME and FPO that move their interest from strict-capital interest to a more general interest. It is

⁴ Their approach – belonging to the EMES Network one – relies on the global assumption that there exist a diversity of social enterprises, that can be characterized through three interdepend dimensions: the nature of social mission, the type of economic model and the governance structure. This issue is beyond the topic of this paper, more details can be found in Defourny, Hulgård & al. (2014).

the view of CSR departments of multinational corporations, foundations ... In this perspective, *“social enterprises are companies developing business activities for a social purpose or mission”* (p. 15). The authors seem uncomfortable with this position. Indeed they specify: *“Many would then argue that such embeddedness ensures the primacy of the social mission [...] whatever the ownership and governance structures and the allocation of profits. This is probably often true of small and medium-sized enterprises, whose founders/owners are more likely to be motivated by a balanced combination of economic and social goals. It is however much more doubtful when high-profit perspectives become the main driver of large capital investments, as in the case of huge mergers leading multinationals to control hundreds or thousands of institutions for the elderly, among other examples.”* (p. 15).

As the French home care services industry⁷ includes NPO, public organizations, SME and listed companies, the industry is exemplar of the ambiguity related to the definition of what a social enterprise is. Indeed, the market-based activities of home care services have a social field (as other healthcare services). Consequently, their global interest may be considered as a part of the production. In other words, any sort of FPO of home care services, as they have a social activity according to their production might be in “Social Economy” or “Third sector”. In other words, the category of social enterprise allows including in a same whole both NPO and FPO.

Salamon & Sokolowski (2016) thus develop the concept of Third Sector or Social Economy (TSE) in order to exclude companies that are explicitly surplus-distribution-based. Additionally to the three characteristics of Third sector described above (private; self-governed and non-compulsion), an organization that belongs to the TSE must be *“totally or significantly limited from distributing any surplus they earn to investors, embers or other stakeholders”*. To Salamon & Sokolowski (2016), this limitation may be either direct through a limit on distributed surplus or indirect, regarding some constraints on the organizations’ operations that implicitly constitute a limit to surplus distribution. As social enterprises are defined through their social activity, they might be for profit while their profit distribution is limited. Thus this criterion may allow including both for profit social enterprises and NPO into Third sector or social economy.

Social enterprise growth and the contribution of Salamon & Sokolowski (2016) extend the traditional core of what is scholarly named as Third sector or social economy, thus extending the boundaries of this area (Grønbjerg, 2016). Social enterprises appear as a new way of sharing the responsibility for the common good (Defourny & Nyssens, 2016). Nevertheless traditional actors of the social economy (NPO) studied in this paper do not recognize the new ones’ as belonging to their community. These two sorts of actors claim opposite goals and mobilize these goals to narrate their identities.

Complementary to the characterization of social enterprise and of social economy, the field of hybrid organizations aims to discuss the tension between social and economic issues that challenge both NPO and FPO with a social activity like home care services. As social enterprises pursue both a mission of financial sustainability and a social goal, they are exemplar of hybrid organizations and attract scholars’ attention (Doherty, Haugh & al., 2014, Jäger & Schröer, 2014, Mair, Mayer & al., 2015). The study of their governance can explain how hybrids organizations manage the tensions between their two main goals –social welfare and commercial logic. In this perspective, Mair, Mayer & Lutz (2015) identify three sort of hybrids organizations. The two first constitute *“conforming hybrids”*, each one prioritizing a single logic, either social welfare or commercial logic. At

the opposite the “*genuine hybrids*” navigate between both logics. These findings suggest that some social enterprises assume hybridity for symbolic reasons while genuine hybrids do so for substantive reasons. Social enterprise appears far from a uniform category and the narrative organizational identity does not appear sufficient to characterize the opposition between NPO and FPO.

The goal of this paper is to compare the organization of FPO productive activity with the NPO’s one, not to examine the surplus distribution of home care services’ FPO or to examine the governance of the different sort of organizations. By mobilizing an approach than is not focused on the sole institutional dimension but also on the productive dimension, I indirectly contribute to the debates on what social economy and third sectors are, and to a better comprehension of hybrid organizations.

3. The Productive models framework and the characterization of synchronic diversity

The productive models framework was developed to describe a synchronic diversity of firm strategies and governance into an industry within a sole macroeconomic context (Boyer & Freyssenet, 2002a, b). It is kind of a response to the national model of firms, in particular, the dichotomy between the *J firm* and the *A firm* of Aoki (1986). Using this framework, Yokota (2013) shows that *Toyota* and *Honda* automotive constructors –two *J firms*– have different productive models in a synchronic perspective, and that these differences can be explained in a long-term perspective by the core competence of the firm. As the framework aims at describing the diversity, it is specifically relevant to the goal of discussing the formal opposition between NPO and FPO. Furthermore, the productive models framework explicitly articulates a political dimension and a productive dimension. The former appears particularly relevant in order to discuss the opposition between NPO and FPO that both civil society and many scholars tend to politically advocate: the fairness of NPO since they have specific governance rules or restricted surplus distribution. The latter allow discussing a general argument mobilized by the studied NPO: “we don’t produce the same service as FPO”.

Initially developed in order to characterize the automotive industry, the framework is based on intermediate concepts and thus can be extend to other industries. It already has been successfully extended to characterize the pharmaceutical industry (Montalban & Sakinç, 2013). In this section, I describe the seminal framework and propose some extensions in order to characterize the home care services industry and to discuss the common opposition between NPO and FPO.

The major assumption of the framework is that each company has to deal with two radical uncertainties linked to the macroeconomic level –the growth mode of the national income. The first is about the labor factor, i.e. how to manage the labor force and the uncertainties about work quality. The second deals with the market of good and services, i.e. how to choose the selling conditions of the products and how to identify customers, in other words, how to market the products. At the face of these uncertainties, the productive model of the firm is a coherent manner to manage the factors of production through a *profit strategy* (at least a balance equilibrium strategy) and through an internal *enterprise government compromise*.

This profit strategy relies on the exploitation of six pure profit sources (cf. Box 2), several of which can be mixed. To be sustainable, a profit strategy has to be coherent with the market structure of the industry.

The profit strategy relies on an enterprise governance compromise comprising three components: the product policy, the employment relationship and the productive organization (cf. Box 3). To be more precise, as profit strategies may be multiple, if a firm develops a specific profit strategy, then its enterprise government compromise must be compatible with the chosen strategy. Nevertheless, the productive models rather result from an unintentional process of trial and errors than from a precisely forecasted one. Thus the productive models may differ from the narrated organizational identity.

Box 2 - The six profit sources

1. *Economies of scales*, with fixed costs being distributed across the widest possible volume so as to reduce unit costs,
2. *The diversity of products offered*, this being something that make it possible to extend demand to solvent clienteles by satisfying their expectations
3. *Product quality*, enabling a higher sales price or increased market share
4. *Commercially relevant innovation*, thus guaranteeing a monopoly rent for a variable period of time
5. *Productive flexibility*, allowing for a rapid adjustment of costs to variations in demand
6. *Permanent reduction in costs*, so that sufficient profit margins can be maintained whatever the circumstances

Boyer & Freyssenet (2002a, p. 164)

Box 3 - The three dimensions of the enterprise government compromise

1. *Product policy* refers to target markets and market segments: to the design and range of products on offer; to sales volume objectives; to the models' diversity; and to quality, novelty and margins
2. *Productive organization* refers to the methods and means that are chosen to enact the product policy; to the extent to which activities have been integrated: to their spatial breakdown; to the organization of design, outsourcing, manufacturing and commercialization; to the technics used; and to the management criteria
3. *The employment relationship* refers to systems of employee recruitment; to employment; to classification; to direct and indirect remuneration; to promotion; to scheduling; to possibilities of expression; and to employee representation

Boyer & Freyssenet (2002a, p. 170)

The intermediate concept of profit strategy may seem inadequate to characterize NPO. Nevertheless NPO need resources to balance their production costs. They can realize surplus even if their prime objective is not its redistribution. In the French lifestyle and home care services industry, the major part of home care services resources is public-based. These public resources are not directly distributed to the producers but are channelled through the customer thanks to a cash-for-care scheme ("*Allocation personnalisée d'autonomie*"). NPO, as well as FPO, thus have to develop strategies in order to sell their services on a competitive market and to balance their production costs. I assume that these strategies are *competitiveness strategy*. This intermediate concept does not exclude surplus realization yet surplus is not necessary the prime objective. Furthermore, competitiveness also is based on the firm' environment. Thus while the

profit sources of the seminal profit strategy were based only inside the firm, there also exist sources of competitiveness outside of the boundaries of the organization. The competitiveness strategy combines internal profit sources and two external components: one generic and one specific to the French home care services industry. The generic component is the integration of the organization into larger chains of production and/or of distribution. It allows taking into account the role of national organizations and their technical support as well as their sell forces; the role of the local healthcare networks for service distribution... The second component of external competitiveness is based on the price policy of the firm regarding to the social protection system. Indeed the cash-for-care scheme of home care services is related to two legal manners of price fixing. In the first configuration (agreement), the firm fixes its price by itself while the amount of cash-for-care received by the elderly is nationally fixed. The firm may thus propose a higher price and options that the elderly will have to pay by herself if she chooses this producer. In the second configuration (authorisation) local authorities in charge of funding the elderly fix the price. The amount of cash-for-care benefice is equal to this publicly fixed price (minus a contribution of the elderly, function of her revenue). Competitiveness thus can be characterized through a degree of freedom for price fixation compared to the price resulting of the public price fixation.

The price fixation refers to the product policy into the internal enterprise government compromise. The NPO usually advocate that they “don’t product the same service as the FPO”. This argument relies on the existence of many sorts of services into the lifestyle and home care services industry, from house cleaning and sport coaching to home care services for disabled and/or aged persons. It also is coherent with the ambition of the French plan for lifestyle and home care services development that expected that NPO would restrict their supply to home social care services while FPO would have a product policy that includes all others sort of services. The economics of services allow characterizing the implications of these differences into the productive models beyond the sole product policy.

Indeed, a service is an operation intended to bring about a change state on a support, the change being effect by a service provider on the demand of the consumer, and in many case, in collaboration with this consumer. Beyond the difference of their immaterial product, the different sort of services does not involve the same co-production process: the consumer is weakly involved in the production of a lifestyle service while she is strongly involved in the production of a care service. The table 1 sums up the difference between lifestyle services and home care services.

Table 1 - The differences between lifestyle services and home care services

	Lifestyle services	Home care services
Major type of service	House cleaning and ironing, ...	Activities of daily living
Support of the service	Material	Human (the customer)
Role of the customer into the production	Weak	Strong (ideally)
Result of the service	Immediate effect. Modify a material thing like dust on furniture	Immediate and mediate effect. Directly concern the person like personal hygiene and ideally may

		improve her capacities on a long term.
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The orientation of the product policy toward lifestyle services or home care services implies a larger differentiation of the ECG than the sole product policy. Furthermore, as they result from a coproduction between a service provider and a customer, the employment relationship is directly linked to a service relationship (Gadrey, 2002).⁵ Therefore the product policy, the employment relationship and the productive organization have to be linked through the service relationship. In other words, the service relationship is central into the enterprise government compromise and different product policies lead to different productive models. Thus if the product policy of NPO is based on home care services and if the product policy of FPO is based on lifestyle services, these two sorts of organizations necessary have different productive models. This argument valid the discourses of NPO that they are different of FPO because they do not produce the same thing: their productive models are different as well as their identity.

4. From organizational identity to ideal-typical productive models

Seminal approaches of the identity of organizations were conceived at the organizational level, distinct from the individual and from the collective levels of analysis. This reasoning is based on the view that “an organization is not a collective composed of individuals but is, in a metaphorical sense, a single organism or human being that can have an identity and ask the self-referential and phenomenological question ‘Who am I (as an organization)?’ ” (Cornelissen, Haslam & *al.*, 2007, p. S6). Following this reasoning, organization identity constitutes an interpretative system, allowing shared cognitions and behaviors. Organizations’ identity is constructed through language, myths, narrative and stories.⁶ Thus it is logical that many scholars have focused their analyse on the role of the leaders for the organizational identity (e.g. Reicher, Haslam & *al.*, 2005).

Oliver, Statler & *al.* (2010) analyse the organizational identity as a dynamic phenomenon contingent on individual actions. According to them “organizational identity is an emergent phenomenon, the outcomes of actions and decisions shape future choices and identity construction” (p. 429). In other words, the choices and decisions that individuals make can impact the organizational identity as well as its long-term future. Conversely, the choices are contingent to current and previous organisational identity.

⁵ To be complete, I also should precise that services are both a process and a product since services result of a coproduction process. That means that even if the product seems to be the same, different processes can generate different results. These results seem similar according to their immediate effect yet they can be differentiated according to their mediate effect, i.e. their results in the long run. As an example there exist at least two different processes in order to produce a service of “meal” for an elderly. The first include help to go and buy groceries with the elderly, help with meal preparation, discussion, maybe cutting food ... the second is just a meal delivery service, like when you order a pizza. The first process strongly associates the person to the service production thus preserving her capacities while the second process does not request her attention or her implication. The mediate result of these two processes is different: the former prevent dependency since its production involves the elderly while the second does not.

⁶ This perspective is also true for “Corporate identity”, i.e. the image projected by the organization, the way it tells itself and to the shared value of the organization.

The choices are made according to the individuals' conception of ethics, ie what is good or bad, right or wrong. Thus, "the dynamic processes associated with organizational identity have an ethical dimension" (p. 429). As an organization is not just a collective of individuals, I assume that the firms' decision as a whole also have an ethical dimension related to its identity as an organization.

This is coherent with the productive model framework where the firm builds its competitiveness strategy according to its vision of the industry, ie what seems good or bad according to its representation of its role as a home care services producer. In the French home care services industry, the historical NPO and the new FPO develop two distinct discourses about who they are, what are their goals, and what is good or bad to them. In other words, NPO and FPO narrate themselves in two opposites ways, thus choosing to advocate different organizational identities related to different conceptions of ethics. The studied NPO and FPO base all their rhetoric on their belonging to the juridical category of association or business. In this section, I translate these identities into two ideal-typical productive models.⁷

The FPO's ideal-typical productive model relies on an industrial market-based perspective, also expected by the French plan for lifestyle and home care services development (Gallois & Nieddu, 2016). The competitiveness of the firm is based on its integration into a national distribution-production process that allows a large volume of production. The profit strategy thus may be based on economies of scales. Nationwide branded mediators, playing the role of middlemen, impose a huge productive flexibility to their local sub-contractors. All these firms aim to be relatively independent of public subsidies and cash-for-care. They consequently build a strategy focused on lifestyle services like house cleaning and ironing. Nevertheless institutional schemes of the Plan for lifestyle and home care services allow them to also propose home care services to the elderly or childcare, thus these firms explicitly may access to the cash-for-care scheme for these sort services. Their enterprise governance compromise is based on a product policy oriented toward dual-income households to whom they propose standardized lifestyle services, easily replicable in all the country. The production is realized through a service relationship in which the worker and the local subcontractor are invisible to the customer. Nevertheless, the consumer assesses the result of their work. The profit source into this productive organization is productive flexibility, a strategy that is sustainable only if the employment relationship also is flexible. Consequently, working times and wages are as bad as job quality. Nevertheless this form of labor flexibility is sustained by the plan for lifestyle and home care services, that aims at creating 300 000 jobs within 3 years, whatever the kind of job.

Conversely historical NPO claim a narrative without capital accumulation. According to their ideal-type only associations (and public organizations) should produce home care services. A compromise between themselves and the local public authorities ("*Conseil général*") should organize the supply since home care services are supposed to be a general interest service (closed of public service). To this goal, local authorities fix the price of the NPO' services through a pricing scheme ("*tarification*") linked with a restrictive creation agreement/authorization procedure of the establishment ("*autorisation médico-sociale*"). Rather than market-based, the resulting prices are

⁷ The ideal-typical construction is done in a weberian perspective, i.e. I stress the characteristics of the opposition between NPO and FPO. This opposition especially appears into the discourses of distinct collective organizations of NPO (federations) and of FPO (professional associations and employer' federation). 40 semi-directive interview and 4 years of participant observation in an NPO' federation documents the two ideal-types.

expected to be determined in order to strictly cover the NPO's production costs. Competitiveness strategies exist even if profit is explicitly rejected. The competitiveness strategy is based on a territory sharing with local monopolies. Such a market structure ensures economies of scale for a sole organization at the local level. NPO are integrated into the healthcare system and its network constitutes both a production chain and a distribution chain. Thus the product policy is oriented toward the elderly and disabled people to whom they offer a large product portfolio of care services, including help to daily activities, home care, nursing care, and sometimes care home. These care services benefit of a cash-for-care scheme, thus payment is indirectly realized by the state and the social protection system. Such services are produced by a qualified employee thus the employment relationship is fordist rather than flexible. A couple employee-helped person coproduce the service into a co-construction service relationship where the service support is the helped person herself. As they are locally based, the NPO also benefit of a supportive help from their national organizations (federations), which provide technical support and realize a political lobbying.

NPO and FPO advocate opposite discourses about what the home care services industry should be. Nevertheless my observations indicate that the reality of the industry is more complex than the organizational identities advocated at the group level. The actions of an organization can be opposite to the collective discourse. As an example, many NPO sell market-based lifestyle services. The literature reviewed above (section 2) also indicates that the opposition between NPO and FPO is fragile as these two sorts of organizations may belong to the social economy or may be considered as hybrid organizations. Jäger & Schröer (2014) propose that the organizational identity of hybrid organizations is a various combination between a market identity (weak or strong) and a civil society identity (weak or strong). A large spectrum of organizational identities thus exists. The next section tests the opposition between the narrated ideal-types of productive models by mobilizing the national data on the LHCS industry. The section sixth discusses these oppositions with my observations.

5. A global overview of the (lifestyle and) home care services industry and its organizations

The French statistical data confirm the opposition between NPO and FPO. The organizations are separated in different categories according to their legal status. Thus their productive models necessarily are opposed according to this institutional dimension. In this section, I analyze the national data in order to characterize the two sorts of organizations regarding the ideal-type of productive models described above. Two sources coexist and will be examined.

The first characterizes the whole lifestyle and home care services industry. The statistical agency of the French Ministry of Labor establishes the administrative data of this base. It discriminates the organizations into four legal categories. The data develop a special focus on the associations, i.e. the historical producers of home care services and on private companies, i.e. the new entrants into the industry. It thus allows extrapolating the corresponding average productive models (see **Table 2**). In 2014, associations dominate the market while the market share of private companies is growing since the Plan for Lifestyle and home care services (2005). All these sorts of organizations essentially produce home care services. Home care services represent 57% of the global activity of associations while it only represents 33% of the whole activity of the private companies. Their organizational characteristics also differ: in average, associations have

a sales volume superior than the one of private companies (212 millions against 115). Their size also is bigger than private companies (43 employees against 13) even if the work-time of their employee is longer (883 hours/year against 765). These organizational characteristics indicate that, the NPO may effectively have a profit strategy based on internal economies of scale since they have a higher activity volume than FPO. Conversely, the relatively small size of FPO is compatible with a profit strategy based on productive flexibility as described in the FPO ideal-type of productive model. This also is coherent with the employment relationship in FPO that appears flexible since the average work time is very low (less than the half of the legal annual full time of work in France, 1600h). Yet the average work time is not significantly higher in the NPO, which seems incompatible with the fordist like employment relationship that they advocate. There are few differences between the two sorts of organizations regarding to their employment relationships. Furthermore, the home care services are important in the product policy of these two sorts of organizations, even if the associations are more home care services oriented than the FPO.

Self-employment is a particular legal form of FPO, distinct from other private companies in the French data. According to its characteristics, it seems close of the ideal-typical productive model of FPO. Firstly, conversely to other private companies their main activity is a lifestyle service. Secondly with an average of 1 employee by organization and an average activity volume that corresponds to the quarter of a full time job, they are very small organizations with a highly flexible employment relationship coherent with a productive flexibility profit policy. Yet, even if self-employment appears very close of the FPO ideal type of productive model, this form of organization has a confidential market share (1%).

The second database is focused on the sole home care services industry, identified with its activity code corresponding to the national industrial classification. It only includes organizations that have registered themselves as home care services when they were created (while there exist around 40 different activity codes for the whole lifestyle and home care services industry). Thus all these organizations are expected to have a product policy oriented toward home care services. As the database is aggregated and analyzed by an organism that promotes third sector the data offers a large place to the organizations of the “social economy” (see Table 3). As in the first source, associations are opposed to private companies. The associations also dominate the industry with a nearly 80% market share while private companies sells hardly represent 13% of the market. The market share of the associations is higher when only home care services are considered, which is coherent with their expected specialization on home care services. Nevertheless, with a market share of 13% the private companies cannot be ignored. The average number of employees as well as the average activity volume of associations is twice bigger than those of private companies. The organizational characteristics of the associations are coherent with the local monopoly and its internal economies of scale profit strategy that is advocate by NPO. Meanwhile, the size of private companies is quite bigger than if we consider the whole LHCS industry and thus appears poorly coherent with the productive flexibility described into their ideal-typical productive model.

Furthermore the average work times are superior to those observed for the whole industry of lifestyle and home care services, both for the associations and for the private companies. Nevertheless work time appears around one quarter superior in the associations than in private companies. With an average work time of 1241h/year the associations tend toward a full time of employment and seems closer of a fordist

employment relationship than in the whole LHCS. Conversely, the employment relationship is less flexible in the private companies.

Table 2 - Characterization of the suppliers of lifestyle and home care services

	Association	Public organism	Private companies (except self-employment)	Self-employment	TOTAL
Nb. Of organization	5 620	1 340	11 400	7 510	25 870
Paid hours of work	212 773 100	39 579 300	115 016 400	3 327 100	370 695 900
Nb. Of employee	240 900	34 600	150 400	6 700	432 600
Main activities	Home care services (57% of sells)	Home care services (56% of sells)	Home care services (33% of sells)	House cleaning/ironing (38% of sells)	
Market share (%)	57%	11%	31%	1%	100%
Average size (salaries/organization)	43	26	13	1	17
Average activity volume (in hours of services sell)	37860	29537	10089	443	14329
Average work time / employee (hours/years)	883	1144	765	497	857

Our calculus from DARES data, year 2014, Field: France

Table 3 - Characterization of the suppliers of home care services

	Association	Other organism of Social economy	Public organism	Private companies	TOTAL
Nb. Of organization	4400	90	362	2080	
Total payroll (thousand €)	2298000	72400	145918	374900	
Nb. Of employee	184500	4900	10876	38000	
Market share (%)	79%	3%	5%	13%	
Average size (salaries/organization)	42	54	30	18	
Average activity volume (in hours of services sell)	52 048	80 169	40 171	17 962	
Average work time / employee (hours/years)	1241	1472	1337	983	

Our calculus from Recherches & solidarité (aggregation of ACOSS-URSSAF and MSA databases)
Year: 2010; Field France

Within the two statistical sources, the differences of size and employment relationships between NPO and FPO are coherent with the ideal-typical productive models previously established. NPO are more home care services oriented than FPO. The employment relationship appears less flexible in NPO than in FPO. Nevertheless, the difference of time worked is more relevant for the whole lifestyle and home care services than for the sole area of home care services, and the employment relationship is less flexible in home care services. Furthermore, the large size of private companies in home care services tends to refute the assumption of a profit strategy based on the sole productive flexibility as described in their ideal-type. This characterization with national statistics is

fragile since it is only based on averages. Furthermore, the productive models described are incomplete since data only allow approximating the internal organization of the firms.

6. A monograph-based classification

In order to discuss this statistical opposition, I have collected dedicated data on the productive models of organism of home care services of a same territory. These data characterize the internal and the external competitiveness sources. These productive models are classified in order to develop the discussion on the distinction between NPO and FPO.


Data collection

Fifteen monographs of productive models of home care services organizations were realized during my PhD thesis (Gallois, 2012); they were frequently updated until 2015. These monographs characterize all the organizations of a competition area (the city of Rheims in France). They include 8 NFPO and 7 FPO. As the FPO advocate an industrial model, the level of industrialisation is characterized with two proxies. The first characterizes the external labour division between the firm and its national supportive network (like a national federation or a chain of stores). The second characterizes the labour division in the organization with the number of professions that exist in the firm. Conversely, networks with other local healthcare suppliers are advocated by NPO as a distribution chain. They are a characteristic of the proximity. Thus, these networks, as well as their strength are characterized. The price fixing strategy is characterized through degree of freedom regarding the price fixed by local authorities. Three sorts of freedom degrees were identified: geographic option, volume discounts, fixed costs invoiced. Finally the activity's volume (in hours) qualifies a size criterion. The pure source of profit of the productive models were also collected and characterized; yet they are not directly relevant since they result from the other dimensions of the productive models. Nevertheless they are complementary mobilized in the result description.

Results

An ascending hierarchical classification of the 15 productive models is realised from 6 qualitative variables totalizing 30 modalities (details are in Appendix 1). Six different groups of productive models are identified: 1) the work integration NPO, that only includes one organization; 2) the flying solo group, that also includes only one organization; 3) the historical giant, that includes 2 NPO; 4) the chain stores' group, that includes two FPO; 5) the locally focused chain stores, that includes both NPO and FPO; and 6) a mix-group without clear boundaries and that includes NPO and FPO. A dendrogram (Graph 1) represents this classification. In the classification, two groups of organizations include both NPO and FPO regarding to the closeness of their productive models. Nevertheless, others groups also are interesting since groups of NPO and groups of FPO alternate regarding to the similarities and oppositions of their productive models. To discuss this classification were NPO and FPO cannot be opposed, I now present the productive model of each group. The interpretation of the classification is based on multiple correspondence analysis (see Appendix 2).

Graph 1 – The classification of the productive models



The **first group** only includes one work integration's NPO (NPO-7). Its productive model differs of all the other, including both FPO and NPO. Its industrialisation level is median but very specific as there are a high number of different professions and a few national supports since the national federation of work integration is poorly organized compared to home care services federations.

This NPO is part of a high number of networks. Additionally to healthcare networks, it is also part of integration networks. All these networks constitute an effective distribution chain, thus the NPO has an important volume of activity. The effectiveness of these networks contributes to a profit strategy based on service diversity and economies of scales.

Although public authorities fix the price for home care services, the price fixing of the organization is far from the public price for others services. The NPO is organized as a holding and only the part of the establishment that is dedicated to home care services is publicly price fixed. The other parts of the activity benefits of degree of freedom for

price fixing. Being a work integration organization gives it some advantageous degree of freedom through a specific employment relationship: only the hours of work where the employee is with the client are paid, hours of work related to transport, to work organization/reporting, to management or to training, are not paid. This particular employment relationship allows mobilizing another profit source: permanent reduction in costs.

A **flying solo** FPO (FPO-1) constitutes the second group. The firm use three degrees of freedom to fix it prices. Nevertheless the firm does not benefit of any support, neither a national organization nor local networks. Thus it would have to build itself the whole production and distribution chains but the firm won't be able to develop theses chains and will stay with a very few activity, that does not balance the fix costs (even with an only worker). With a productive flexibility strategy without an effective main contractor, this firm disappeared as soon as it appears on the market. Many flying solo FPO have been observed in the competition area, but –to my knowledge- there never was more than one or two at the same time.

The **historical giant** group includes two NPO (NPO-3 and NPO-5). These two associations are strongly integrated into both healthcare network and networks of NPO. They have a closed characteristic of industrialisation: a huge technical and political support from their national federation and an important number of profession into the organizations. Such industrialization is related to an important activity volume since they are leaders on their market area, thus allowing them to realize economies of scales. Nevertheless their profit policy also includes a productive flexibility. They also have diversified the product offered toward lifestyle services in order to extend the demand.

The **chain stores** group includes two FPO (FPO-3 and FPO-7). Even if their levels of industrialization are different, these two organizations have the same form of industrialization: a strong assistance from their national support that allows them having only few professions and a weak internal labour division. Their profit strategy is based on external economies of scale and on productive flexibility. They do not develop local networks, neither as production chain nor as distribution chain. Their price frameworks are complex: the prices vary with the sort of service, the qualification of the employee, the duration (prices decline with the quantity).

The group of **locally focused chain stores** includes one NPO (NPO-1) and two FPO (FPO-5 and FPO-6). The productive model of this group is quite similar to the chain stores' one yet it is rather locally focused. Indeed the organizations benefits form a large assistance from their national level (a chain store, a federation and a franchisor). They also try to develop local distribution chains but their network is poorly effective. Their profit strategy also is closed of the chain stores' one. It is based on a combination of productive flexibility and economies of scales. Nevertheless, NPO-1 and FPO-6 also enlarge their offer with lifestyle services in order to diversify their customers.

Finally the **Mix group** includes 4 NPO (NPO-6; NPO-8; NPO-2 and NPO-4) and 2 FPO (FPO-2 and FPO-4). Into this group, there is no clear boundary between NPO and FPO since their productive models are different from the two ideal-typical one that I draw above. This group is as residual as strongly instructive: there is no clear opposition between the productive models of NPO and FPO when the main focus is not on their legal status.

7. Discussion

The ascending hierarchical classification of 15 productive models of home care service producer indicates that the boundaries between FPO and NPO are more fragile when the focus is on the organization of the production than when it is on the legal status. Indeed, within a market-based industry of social services, no clear difference appears between NPO and FPO except their legal status.

Responding to a market-based policy that opens new market segments, 7 of the 8 NPO have extended their portfolio to lifestyle market-based services within an increased competition environment. This decision was difficult for many of them; however, it was justified since these new profitable services could balance their social activities. In the Belgian industry of housework services, Defourny, Henry & *al.* (2010) argue that the mission of the service provider matters, thus even if NPO and FPO compete their first goal differs and their related organization of the production stay different. Their empirical analyze shows that the third sector organizations try to maintain job quality on this competitive market while FPO operate a costs' minimization to the detriment of job quality. Their thesis seems coherent with the rationale of the home care services NPO (diversification allow to balance the social activity, in other words their main mission).

Such adaptation strategies have also been identified in other industries. As noted by Alexander (2000) the marketization of non-profit organizations is a common trend since the beginning of the new public management and its related financial cutbacks (in the 1980's or 1990's). In Alexander's study, the NPO also develop adaptive strategies, many of them using business methods. But more interesting is that networking was a major adaptation to a more competitive environment, leading to a coopetition situation. Networks were part of my proxies of the productive models of home care services organizations. Networks clearly play an important role into the ideal-typical productive model of the NPO since networks act as a distribution chain at the local level and as a support at the national level. Nevertheless the studied FPO of the "locally focused chain store group" and in the "mix group" also use networking as a distribution chain. The similarity with NPO appears even stronger since some FPO explicitly try to copy the networks of NPO. Indeed NPO-5 is actively involved in a local network of home care services FPO, a network institutionally organized by the FPO largest employer federation (the MEDEF – Movement of the Enterprises of France – represents the employers of all the industries). Furthermore, the manager of FPO-5 has created a national federation of home care services FPO with the objective "to do like UNA [one of the two major NPO federations]".⁸ Conversely the historical federation of rural associations of home care develops a chain group like strategy. NPO-1 represents this federation in my sample. At the local level, this NPO is poorly involved in the healthcare networks. Such a few involvements both results of national pressures (the national federation explicitly refuses that local organizations participates to local association networks) and of a local behavior since the cooperation actions essentially respond to legal obligations. To NPO-1 competition and business extension clearly are more important goals than cooperation, and competition takes place with FPO as with NPO. Even if it was historically rural NPO-1 had chosen to create a store inside the urban area acting at the opposite of the territory sharing of the ideal typical productive model of NPO by directly competing the other urban NPO (to be more precise, the store was located at only 600 meters of another historical NPO). This offensive development

⁸ Semi-directive interview of the manager (March the 15th 2011, Reims).

strategy is not the only sort of behavior that is more firm-like than NPO-like. Indeed as in any other chain store an equalization scheme operate between the different local associations. Profitable stores balance the losses of the less cost effective ones. Such an equalization scheme should be considered as a form of solidarity between the different associations. Nevertheless, it takes place under the national hierarchical authority of the federation, while the third sector model relies on horizontal governance and on free choice: this national federation recently changed its statuses without consultation of the departmental and local associations. Moreover the local managers accuse the national federation of exploiting the volunteers in order to maintain the lavish lifestyle of its managers. The non-profit goal is thus questioned... especially since those managers are the main shareholders of FPO that produce supportive services for the local associations of the network.

Nevertheless, the literature reviewed in section 2 indicates that some for profit organizations can belong to the social economy and/or third sector and social economy (Defourny & Nyssens, 2016, Salamon & Sokolowski, 2016). It it's the case of Social enterprises and of hybrid organizations that blur the boundaries between NPO and FPO. Jäger & Schröer (2014) argue that hybrid organizations create "functional solidarity". Their organizational identity systematically integrates civil society and markets, both mobilized to create the functional solidarity. Some of the studied FPO corresponds to this point of view regarding to their non-market activity on network. Conversely, nearly all the NPO extend their action to market in order to reinforce their social mission by creating a form of solidarity between the consumers of lifestyle services and the consumers of home care services.

Thus the characterization as hybrid organizations of all the NPO and FPO of the home care services industry appears more relevant that the common opposition between NPO and FPO, even if this opposition resist in their respective narratives, and thus their organizational identities. The classification of Mair, Mayer & Lutz (2015) identifies three sort of hybrids organizations within (FPO) social enterprises according to their governance: the conforming hybrids, that prioritize the social welfare, the ones which prioritize the commercial logic and the genuine hybrids that navigate between the both logic. My work on productive organization contributes to enlarge this result by showing that both NPO and FPO can be hybrid organizations. Furthermore it leads to indicate that some legally NPO conform themselves to the commercial logic rather than to the social welfare logic, revealing a new sort of hybrid which aim at building a social welfare-based collective identity but adopt a market-based behavior.

8. Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to discuss the common opposition between NPO and FPO by focusing on their productive dimension rather on their institutional/legal dimension. To this purpose the French home care services industry appeared particularly relevant. Indeed, both NPO and FPO compete in an industry where the production has intrinsically a social goal. Thus each sort of producer can be considered as a social enterprise. An empirical analysis of the productive models of 7 FPO and 8 FPO was realized and compared to the ideal-typical productive model of each group.

The ideal typical productive model of FPO appears non sustainable. The closer productive model observed is the flying solo one, but the related productive flexibility strategy appears non sustainable without a main subcontractor. Conversely the ideal typical productive model of the NPO also is not exactly observed since the major part of

them now develop lifestyle market-based services. With such a (light) market orientation NPO become hybrid organizations. Furthermore, all rely on a productive flexibility profit source, characteristic of the FPO ideal-type.

Conversely the majority of FPO develops a locally based network, adopting a behavior closed of the NPO ideal-type of productive model. Thus within a market-based regulation of the industry, both NPO and FPO can be considered as hybrid organizations. Their legal status differentiates themselves rather than their productive models.

Appendix 1: List of variables

Variable	Description	Sort of modalities	Comments
Level of national assistance	Describe the assistance from the national level of the organization. This national level can be a federation, a chain store or a franchisor.	Five ranks, from A0 to A4, A0 means an absence of national assistance	
Nb.Profession	Describe the labor division into the organization	Four ranks, form NP0 to NP3, NP0 means a low labor division inside the firm	Discretized with the following classes: 0 to 2 professions: NP0 3 to 6: NP1 7 to 9: NP2 10 to 12: NP3
Nb. Network	Describe the number of network	Four ranks from Nb0 to Nb3, Nb0 means an absence of network	Three sort of networks are examined: healthcare system networks, assistance networks and others
Strengthen.Network	Describe the strengthen of the networks	Five ranks from F0 to F4, F0 means a null strengthen.	The strengthen is ranked from 0 to 2 for each of the 3 networks described above
Prices	Describe the number of degree of freedom compared with the public fixed price	Five ranks, from P0 to P4, P0 describe the price fixing of a firm when its prices are fixed by local authorities P4 means that the firm mobilize 4 different degree of freedom to fix its price	
Activity	Describe the annual volume of production (in hours of service)	From Act0 to Act8, Act0 means a very low volume	Discretized with the following classes Act0 : activity <2500h/year Act1 = 2500-9999 Act2 = 10 000 – 24 999 Act3= 25 000-49 999 Act4= 50 000-99 999 Act5= 100 000-149 999 Act6= 150 000-199 999 Act7= 200 000-249 000 Act8= > 250 000

Appendix 2: Multiple correspondence analyze, main results

Table 4 – Proportion of explained inertia by dimension

results\$eig	eigenvalue	percentage of variance	cumulative percentage of variance
Dim1	0.81347356	20.3368391	20.33684
Dim2	0.63926485	15.9816212	36.31846
Dim3	0.53790519	13.4476299	49.76609
Dim4	0.37328224	9.3320560	59.09815
Dim5	0.32234577	8.0586442	67.15679
Dim6	0.31517493	7.8793733	75.03616
Dim7	0.27083248	6.7708121	81.80698
Dim8	0.19777531	4.9443827	86.75136
Dim9	0.16232856	4.0582141	90.80957
Dim10	0.13312074	3.3280185	94.13759
Dim11	0.11771720	2.9429300	97.08052
Dim12	0.06009470	1.5023675	98.58289
Dim13	0.04557866	1.1394665	99.72235
Dim14	0.01110580	0.2776451	100.00000

The cumulative percentage of variance within 4 dimensions is 59, thus the MCA is realized from these 4 dimensions.

Table 5 – Modalities of the variables and individuals by their main dimension

Dimension	Modalities of the variables that characterise the dimension	Individuals described by the dimension
Dim1	A0 Nb0 F0 P3 Act0	FPO-1 FPO-7
Dim2	A1 Nb3 P2 Act5	NPO-7
Dim3	NP1 (-) Nb1 (-) Nb2 F4 P4 (-) Act3 (-) Act7	NPO-5 FPO-1 FPO-2 (-)
Dim4	A4 (-) F1 (-)	NPO-1 (-) NPO-2 NPO-6 FPO-5 (-)

Contribution of the modalities of the variables and of the individuals to the dimensions 1 to 4. The sign (-) indicates negative coordinates.

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